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I. Introduction 
 
‘How, moreover, might epidemics of fear if not disease be sociologically explained and 
understood?’  Stephen Williams, From Smart Bombs to Smart Bugs, 2001 
 
Epidemics of fear, perhaps also of disease: here are two of our most prominent anxieties. By ‘us’ 
I mean the various academics, experts and professionals, who in the ‘western’ nations of North 
America, Europe and Australia have ongoing conversations on these subjects. We certainly 
worry about disease. Health professionals genuinely fear the possibility of a vast outbreak of a 
new or re-emerging infectious disease; some are worried about being deliberately attacked with 
biological weapons; and there are many who fear the ‘urban health penalty’, the disease 
burdens consequent on polluted urban environments with weak social network resources to 
limit their occurrence (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000). But they don’t just worry about these 
events – they (we) also worry about fear-mongering, as well. Many health professionals worry 
about the enormous impacts that public fears may have on economies and societies: ‘the 
problem with SARS,’ I have heard several in Canada say, ‘was not SARS itself, but fear’ (Skinner, 
2003). By this they mean that the disruptions of SARS were vastly disproportionate to its body 
count of 44 deaths, a very small number in comparison with the mortality rate commanded by, 
inter alia, smoking, drinking, driving and not getting a flu vaccine. I know they recall, and would 
like to prevent, other situations where public worries unjustified by scientific evidence - say, of 
radiation from powerlines (Abt, 1994, Campion, 1997) - caused much social upheaval and a 
great expenditure of public money that could have saved many lives if it had been spent on 
hospital beds rather than on calming unfounded fears. Yet they seem to make little professional 
effort to trace the tensions between their fears and their fears of fear (Lupton, 1999, Gordon, 
2003). And so we who sardonically observe the antics of public health from the padded 
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balconies of the humanities worry and wonder about their (our) worrying: is ours a ‘risk society’ 
(Adam et al 2000, Beck, 1999), a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2002)? 
 
In this chapter I will join this - these - conversations to reflect on current concerns about, and 
responses to, the threats of infectious disease, specifically in an urban context. First, I will 
situate these concerns and reactions in a more general conceptual framework, concerns about 
‘health scares’ – events in which there is a strong social reaction to a specific hazard that 
appears to threaten the health of a significant portion of the population. This is, if you will, the 
problem of not-disease-but-‘fear itself’ that was mentioned above. I briefly discuss concerns 
with epidemics of new and re-emerging infectious diseases as a particular category of health 
scare. In asking how we can analyse, predict and, perhaps, prevent or resolve health scares I 
then turn to the ‘social amplification of risk’ framework and to the role that networks – actor-
networks that link humans and non-humans in specific responsive alliances, and social 
networks, including intra-urban networks, professional networks and global cities networks – 
may play in the amplification or attenuation of risk issue signals and so to the resolution or 
otherwise of health scare situations. In the remainder of the chapter I show how networked 
social amplification and attenuation effects played out in the outbreaks of SARS in Toronto in 
the spring of 2003. I conclude with comments on the central importance of social and 
professional informational networks and connectivity in the ecology of the urban landscape for 
successfully managing health scares in the future. 
 
II. Health Scares 
 
‘Like a haunted house the morning after Halloween, many a bloodcurdling health hazard looks 
less frightening in the daylight of follow-up studies than it did in the first shriek of publicity.’ 
Avery Comoraw, Less Than Scary Health Scares: Killer Cranberries?, 2000  
 
‘In U.S., Fear Is Spreading Faster Than SARS’ New York Times Banner Headline, April 17, 2003 
 
Public health responses to SARS can only be fully understood as part of a set of wider concerns 
to which I referred in the opening paragraph: concerns about possible catastrophes on one 
hand, and about damaging public reactions, not justified by scientific calculation, to certain 
imagination-grabbing risks on the other. In this section I argue that a new phenomenon has 
been born from this tension: health scares. Since the subject has not yet attracted scholarly 
analysis (but see Gwyn 2002, Leiss, 2001), in this section I offer some evidence about what kind 
of social phenomenon health scares are. 
 
Firstly, health scares are a new social phenomenon. They are hybrid representational-physical 
entities. They are real not as epidemics or earthquakes are real, but real in a social sense: 
products of recent politico-cultural concerns, they are events marked by sudden mass 
insecurities about the consequences of an increasingly globalised, fluid, late-capitalist world. I 
will demonstrate: A search using the term ‘health scare’ on electronic indexes – those for news 
sources, such as CBCA Direct, or for health and medicine, such as PubMed or Medline, and those 
for the social sciences, such as sociofile – shows that colloquially at least, there is a widely 
accepted concept of ‘health scares’ as bounded events in which a group of people hold 
significant fears for their health. This search collected 56 news articles, many of which contained 
the term ‘health scare’ in their titles, and 160 publications in scholarly and professional 
literatures. The overwhelming majority of articles in both categories were published in the mid 
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to late 1990s. As the earliest studies in the scholarly/professional collection were published in 
the early 1970s, this indicates that our preoccupation with ‘health scares’ is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Moreover, although one news article contained references to health 
controversies from the 1950s and 60s (Rosner and Markowitz, 2002), all the health scares 
discussed in the scholarly/professional literature occurred in the period after 1970. This period 
has also seen the growth of scholarly and professional attention to emergency preparedness 
and planning and of preoccupations with concepts of ‘risk’ in the health sciences in particular. 
 
So what kind of events do we think ‘health scares’ are? It turns out that health scares occur in a 
wide variety of domains. The scholarly/professional literature contained 178 individual 
discussions of 49 health scares topics, including BSE / prion diseases, HIV/AIDS, SARS, fluoride in 
water, X rays, genetically modified foods, hormone replacement therapy (HRT), vaccine side 
effects, channel blocker side effects, radiation from mobile phones and powerlines, Tylenol 
tampering, dioxins, radon gas, cryptosporidium in water supplies, flesh eating disease, 
hazardous wastes, food irradiation, acrylamide in foods, West Nile virus, breast implants, Ebola, 
phthalates, polluted apple juice, lead, vinyl chloride (PCBs), swine flu, bioterrorism, alar and 
hormones in the milk supply. These health scares came from six domains: disease, especially 
communicable disease; toxins and contaminants of air, food or water; environmental pollution; 
side effects of medical products or procedures; intentional harm; and the unanticipated 
consequences of products or industrial operations (eg genetically modified foods (GM foods), 
silicone breast implants). Several health scares fitted more than one domain: BSE, for example, 
was represented as both a disease and as an outcome of late industrial agribusiness practices 
(Miller, 1999, Ratzan, 1998). The news literature added new local examples from the same 
domains.  
 
One really important characteristic that emerged from this study is that despite the increasingly 
multi-networked globalised nature of significant health hazards, health scares reproduce the 
geography of inequality produced by the ‘emerging diseases worldview’ (King, 2002). In a 
meaningful sense, health scares are a ‘first world’ (constructed) phenomenon: they are events 
that happen in North America, the United Kingdom, continental Europe and Australia. Of course 
I don’t mean that similar events don’t happen in the developing world; they undoubtedly do. I 
simply mean that this sample of literature published in English-language professional and 
scholarly journals found no reports of crises or disease outbreaks or any other health hazard in 
the developing world described as ‘health scares’, that the sample (which of course has only 
limited value as the representative of the full opinions of the various authors that contribute to 
it, let alone of social opinion more broadly) effectively distinguished between the ‘health scares’ 
that occurred in developed nations and the ‘tragedies’, ‘epidemics’ and ‘crises’ that burdened 
the developing world. Only HIV/AIDS crossed these two categories, being a kind of health scare 
whose severest consequences were felt in the poorest countries. It is also significant that 
although a few articles concerned threats from within secure nations (eg, of tuberculosis among 
drug using populations) the sample was largely blind to the disease burdens of inequitable 
urban ecologies (Vlahov and Galea, 2002), apart, perhaps, from the implications of some articles 
concerned with local pollutants. From this de facto representation of ‘health scares’ I draw the 
tentative conclusion that they are most accurately described as those events that seem to 
threaten the privileged and relatively secure West. 
 
Allowing for the fact that controversy continues in most cases at some level, all health scare 
events discussed in the sample could be classified according to three fears/outcomes profiles, as 
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depicted in the table below. The overwhelming majority fell into Square G: Fears of large scale 
destruction but with low to non existent actual mortality (so far): examples include BSE, 
inhalation anthrax, SARS, GMOs, radiation from powerlines and mobile phones masts, dioxins 
and radon in homes. A small group, largely composed of events involving new hazard 
notifications warning of small rises in the risks attached to specific medical products or 
procedures, fell in Square I: Low fears and low outcomes. Examples include scares around 
brands of oral contraceptives, vaccines and channel blockers. (It should be noted for this profile 
(1) that whilst the reported rise in risk was majoratively very small, the numbers of people using 
these products or procedures and thus affected by the hazard notification was often very large, 
and (2) in several cases later reviews of scientific data found no rise in risk at all (eg Spitzer, 
1999). Largely, therefore, I is a subset of G.) Finally, a few ‘health scares’ really did become crisis 
events, falling into Square E: Severe fears and anticipated outcomes. Examples include food and 
water borne outbreaks such as the epidemic of e-coli related disease in Walkerton, Ontario, and 
tuberculosis among the homeless. These cases, except HIV, were localized. I conclude from this 
spread that ‘health scares’ are not so much events in which there is a strong fear response from 
the public but no ‘real’ threat – which is how health professionals often describe them - but 
events in which fears of possible but unlikely catastrophe are entertained in conditions of 
scientific uncertainty and cultural insecurity. 
 
Table I: Fears/ Outcomes as described in articles  
 
 Fears of catastrophe Fears of severe 
outcomes 
Fears of tiny increase 
in risk 
Large scale 
devastation 
A 
 
B C 
Significant mortality D 
HIV/AIDS (developing 
world) 
E  
Cholera, water borne 
disease outbreaks, 
lead poisoning, 
meningitis 
F 
Low or nonexistent 
mortality to date 
G 
BSE, anthrax, SARS, 
Tylenol tampering, 
dioxin, GM foods, 
flesh eating disease, 
radiation from cell 
phones, terrorism, 
acrylamide, Ebola, 
alar, PCBs, swine or 
avian influenza 
H 
Radon gas, West Nile 
virus  
I 
Oral contraceptives, 
HRT, vaccines, 
fluoride in water, X 
rays, channel 
blockers, cancer 
mortality, phthalates, 
interferon 
 
 
Finally, although they seem unreal because of their low mortality rates, virtually all health scares 
have commanded attention and concern from journalists and health professionals because of 
the all-too-real economic cost and social disruption that they have caused. The two are 
intertwined, of course: often the ‘problem’ was not so much that people ceased eating 
cranberries or beef, or even that they ceased using the contraceptive pill mid-cycle or pulled 
their child out of a school built near powerlines – in any case many of these behaviour changes 
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were fairly short lived – but the enormous, sometimes devastating, impact these actions had on 
industries and the communities they sustained. And, while local consumer behaviour has been 
significant in generating many of these impacts, it was often trade embargoes and drops in 
tourism that did most of the damage (Powell and Leiss, 1997). Consider BSE: it was the context 
of international trade that made this the costliest health scare the world has ever seen (Ratzan, 
1998). The trade embargoes first put in place by France as a kind of quarantine, and then 
strategically implemented elsewhere (as Canada found to its cost in 2003) bound notions of 
health to national identity and economic power. Trade barriers have to a large extent become 
the lines of hygiene (Bashford, 2001) of the market-driven, deregulated new world order of the 
late twentieth century, lines that mark nations as pure or as contaminated. Amid an effectively 
global, interconnected and highly networked economy, health scares reassert the validity of 
borders: prosperity is equated with security, which decodes to border control for health.  
 
I note here that urbanicity is an important, though relatively unexplored, dimension of health 
scares, for three reasons. Firstly, health scares can be a product of a particular urban setting, as 
for example when a system breakdown (such as a power failure at a local supermarket) causes a 
sudden mass or concentrated health impact (unsuspected cases of food poisoning). Secondly, 
apart from specific agricultural sectors, it is urban areas, particularly global cities, that are likely 
to directly experience the economic impact of health scares, as industries dependent on 
prosperity (tourism, entertainment) reduce. And thirdly, the social inequalities of urban 
geographies can exacerbate a health scare. Cities are resource machines producing and 
distributing resources according to location (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000). Social inequalities 
expressed through hazard exposure – the less privileged, the more vulnerable - and through 
expectations of response, such that those areas within cities with the fewest response resources 
also experience lack of trust, shaping landscapes of fear and despair (Slovic 2000, Fitzpatrick and 
LaGory, 2000).  
 
In sum: health scares are events typically characterised by large-scale fears but very low actual 
mortality and morbidity. As a recent feature of late twentieth century ‘western’ societies, their 
existence supports the contention of ‘risk society’ theorists that we have become very anxious 
about the intrusion of those catastrophes to which we - as opposed to those ‘Others’ in the 
‘third world’  - have hitherto felt immune (Adam et al 2002). This is the context in which 
responses to infectious disease are created. Health scares are ‘problems’ (as in my opening 
quotation, ‘the problem with SARS…’) because of their devastating economic (which means, 
social) consequences. This means that health and economic concerns must be regarded as 
interdependent and as shaping one another: one cannot understand responses to, and 
reflections on, SARS, for example, without understanding these connections. Finally, the 
economic context clearly demonstrates the tensions between the globalising, border-crossing 
tendencies / realities in economic systems, and the reification of nationhood, of national 
economies held and patrolled within national borders. This tension operated in responses to 
contemporary concerns with infectious disease also. 
 
III. Disease Scares: Pandemics 
 
‘In a world where diseases respect no borders, it is important that we cooperate across borders 
internationally as well.’ Canadian Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh to the United Nations, 
November 17, 2004 
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‘[Pandemic preparation] has been done through programs … focused more generally on 
increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and other emerging infectious disease health threats.’ 
United States of America Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Pandemic Influenza 
Response and Preparedness Plan, 2004 
 
 
Among the panoply of health scars, there is a special place reserved in our cultural imagination 
for fears of a mass outbreak of disease. This is attested to by movies such as Virus and Outbreak 
and novels like Robin Cook’s Contagion. When I asked Canadian health professionals and 
policymakers for examples of health scares, they typically thought first of Ebola, West Nile virus, 
Norwalk, meningococcal disease, clostridium difficile, SARS, avian influenza, monkeypox.  
 
Above all, right now we’re all supposed to be worried about a global pandemic of influenza. 
Health professionals on television repeat that the question is not whether this will happen, but 
when. ‘During the last few years, the world has faced several threats with pandemic potential, 
making the occurrence of the next pandemic just a matter of time,’ says the World Health 
Organisation (WHO)’s website (WHO, 2005). Accompanied by well-publicised exhortations from 
the WHO, western nations like Canada, the US and Australia have prepared pandemic influenza 
preparedness plans, publicly stating strategies on everything from vaccine manufacture and 
stockpiling to data collection and management systems.  
 
One key reason for our current anxiety about pandemic influenza is encapsulated in the 
reiterated phrase ‘because we are living in a world where diseases respect no borders’. On the 
face of it, this phrase is a little puzzling: what other kind of world have we ever lived in? It 
indicates a new preoccupation among health professionals – and let us not forget, also among 
(western) security and economic policy makers as well – about the health consequences of the 
dissolution of formerly strong social boundaries, between peoples, communities, professions, 
nations. In particular the physical movement of people through increasingly globalised socio-
economic networks, especially (as discussed elsewhere in this volume) the global cities networks 
has created fears of contagion, both literal and ideological. Diseases of travel – of which SARS 
was considered the precedent setting example – represent the discomfiting reality of the 
connectivity of the developed and developing worlds in late capitalism (Wilson, 1995; de Hart, 
2003). The phrase also evokes those modernist anxieties about transgressions that I mentioned 
above - the theme, common in stories of health scares, that danger results either nature’s 
capacity to elude the artificial boundaries that humans construct, or from human violation of 
‘natural’ boundaries. Pandemics are frightening because they are represented as the 
consequences of particular mobility regimes - the rapid movement of peoples and organisms, 
agricultural and industrial practices that constantly cross boundaries between species – that are 
regarded as unsettling in themselves by many westerners, and which are uncomfortably linked 
by multiple networks to ourselves. The notion of a ‘pandemic’ itself is defined by the travelling 
of a disease: the WHO’s stages of pandemic alert are built around a disease’s geographical 
movement (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2005). 
 
Borders may be meaningless to a microbe, but in pandemic preparedness planning our security 
is perceived to rely on our requiring microbes to respect them anyway. (Hence the conceptual 
and practical entanglement of bioterror – which attacks a state – and influenza preparedness, as 
shown in the quotation above.) Our first move in combating new and re-emerging infectious 
diseases has been to double the guard: to put in place more extensive and rigorous quarantine 
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and border screening regimens, to examine travelers and prospective immigrants and exclude 
those believed to harbour illness, to identify, cordon off and patrol dangerous places in the 
world (Hooker, 2007). Yet at the same time, the successful resolution of a pandemic is believed 
to be vested in global networks of another sort: informational networks, managed virtually 
through technology, directed by an international body, the WHO, and rooted in formal and 
informal social networks between scientists and health professionals (Fidler, 2004).  
 
In sum, network society (Castells, 2000) and contemporary global mobility regimes have 
facilitated expansions of actual microbial traffic along with the transgressive, or at least 
threatening, movements of people and goods. When novel diseases enter the urban ecologies 
of western cities, especially global cities (Sassen, 1991), place and the health burdens shaped by 
inequitable urban geographies can facilitate their spread. As discussed above, this is the primary 
socio-politic-economic context in which health scares occur. How the ‘lifecycle’ of a health scare 
plays out can be tracked by examining what social mechanisms contrive to amplify or attenuate 
collective responses to the health risk as the event progresses. 
 
IV. Network Amplifiers: the social amplification of risk 
 
Understanding how the numerous factors of geographies, media reporting, expert decision 
making, etc, fit together and influence each other in real time to produce a health scare is 
challenging by reason of the complexity of these interactions. In my view the model that can 
best capture this complexity is the social amplification of risk framework (SAR) (Pidgeon et al., 
2003). Developed to understand, predict and manage public response to industry-related 
hazards (nuclear power, the ‘Love Canal’, chemical contamination), the model may be easily 
adapted for use in understanding the causes and effects of major types of health scares, side 
effects of existing therapies and outbreaks of disease. 
 
The SAR framework begins with the assumption that hazards and risk events are only given 
meaning by being observed and communicated by human beings. In the communication 
process, hazards and risk events are portrayed through risk signals (images, signs, symbols), 
which change as they are decoded and transmitted by different ‘receivers’, ie stakeholders and 
social groups. These signals are subject to (somewhat predictable) transformations as they pass 
through different information channels and various social stations, such as government bodies, 
expert or professional groups, the news media, community organizations, and individual people. 
These transformations will amplify or attenuate the signals by such means as increasing or 
decreasing the volume of information about an event, heightening the salience or availability of 
certain aspects of it, or reinterpreting, elaborating, discarding or adding symbols or images 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). The system is dynamic: transformations in one station will feed back 
into the system to affect others. This is how a health scare is socially produced.  
 
The SAR framework also explains the impacts of health scares. Signal amplification or 
attenuation will lead to particular responses by social actors. These responses produce ‘ripple 
effects’, secondary and tertiary consequences that spread far beyond the impact of the hazard 
itself, and include mental perceptions, economic, political and social pressure, social disorder, 
liability, loss of credibility or trust and stigmatization. Some ripple effects may be positive, 
including revised hazard response planning or a reduction in the risk posed by the hazard itself. 
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The advantages of using the SARs framework to analyse health scares can be summarized as 
follows. (1) It helps identify and focus attention on the different social actors involved in a 
health scare, and demonstrates how the health scare is the outcome of interactions within and 
between these actors – including scientists and health experts. This is important because health 
scares are not uncommonly seen as the result of ‘irrational’ behaviour choices or ‘misinformed’ 
action, usually on the part of the public or the media. (2) It demonstrates why responses to, and 
the impacts of, risk events are so often incommensurate with expert risk assessments. Risks are 
no longer ‘real’ or ‘false’: they are both empirically demonstrated (with real consequences) and 
socially constructed by amplification processes. (3) It demonstrates the temporal aspect to 
health scares: how perceptions and relationships alter with changes in hazard notification 
sequences (Pidgeon et al 2003) or communications by specific bodies. (4) It shows how factors 
such as loss of trust between actors can lead to perceptions and responses that serve to amplify 
risk signals and spread ripple effects. As discussed above this may be crucial in local urban 
ecologies. (5) It can be used to show how and why amplification processes cause ripple effects 
such as the Othering and stigmatic-marking of particular social groups, an issue that was of 
particular importance during the SARS outbreak, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.  
 
As yet, the importance and functioning of network society (Castells, 2000) to the SAR framework 
has remained unexplored. And yet clearly social networks are immensely powerful amplification 
or attenuation devices in a health scare situation. The global cities network and other social 
networks among different diaspora have already been identified as a strong amplifier of 
infectious disease risk (Keil and Ali, 2006). In natural disaster situations, social networks are 
crucial management and survival devices, often altering their character and constituency in 
ways that attenuate fear (especially by building trust) more efficiently than the provision of 
external resources. Informational networks – from the informal to those entirely dependent on 
technology – can act as very strong risk signal amplifiers (as in the case of SARS) if their structure 
causes their content to bear characteristics such as novelty, mass impact, or dread (Pidgeon et al 
2003), or as equally strong risk signal attenuators (as in the very beginning and the aftermath of 
SARS). Indeed, given the centrality of the network enterprise in the contemporary world and its 
reliance on the information flows made possible by new technologies (Castells, 2000), the social 
amplification of risk framework might be more usefully constructed around risk signal 
transformations in kinds of networks than in categories of social station. (Incidentally, this 
approach may solve some of the problems so far encountered in rendering the framework 
analytical and predictive rather than merely descriptive, as it allows for the factors that relate 
amplification effects in different social domains  - the media, policymakers and the public for 
instance – to be studied (Breakwell, 2003)). 
 
In the concluding section I examine SARS as a health scare using the social amplification of risk 
framework. I concentrate on which networks acted to amplify or attenuate signals about the risk 
of SARS, and what ripple effects these signal transformations produced.  
 
V. SARS as a health scare 
 
‘I genuinely thought that we were going to see a different world by the next month. I thought we 
were going to be remembered as the people who failed to stop SARS.’ Paraphrased comments 
from the Toronto SARS scientific advisory committee. 
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Risk signals about SARS amplified hugely and rapidly in Toronto during the first days and month 
of the outbreak, generating a health scare unparalleled in professional or public experience 
(interview and focus group data). There is a basic psychometric explanation for this. The 
qualities associated with SARS were those that are typically associated with amplified risk 
perception: the disease was novel; knowledge about it was very limited and its behaviour was 
uncertain; it spread through momentary coincidences, such as sharing an elevator with an 
infected person, and so appeared extremely uncontrolled; it threatened to cause mass 
mortality; there was a certain amount of dread associated with its onset and mortality rate; and 
having crossed from the third world to the first, it was highly salient (Slovic, 2000). But such 
cognitive biases do not explain how social context influenced the construction of this ‘scare’. I 
argue that SARS risk signals were amplified and sometimes surprisingly attenuated through 
three major kinds of networks: professional or expert networks; communications networks; and 
staff or responder networks. It is important to note that in so doing I intend no criticism of the 
actions or decisions of any responder to SARS. 
 
Expert networks. Experts are not immune from psycho-social amplification effects, though their 
knowledge and training may to some degree substitute the rules of rational decision-making 
(Slovic, 2000). If ‘fear’ was a problem during SARS, creating ‘irrational’ decision making with 
consequent negative social and economic effects, as some have suggested (Skinner 2003) then it 
was a significant problem within the SARS scientific advisory committee (SSAC), a close network 
of scientists and public health professionals which, though constituted ad hoc from semi-formal 
professional/personal networks, had formal responsibility for responding to the outbreak. The 
risk signals attached to SARS, including images and symbols of the 1918 ‘Spanish’ influenza 
pandemic -a model which has been used as the standard for measuring possibilities and fears 
about contemporary infectious respiratory illnesses, and which has generated at least one very 
infamous health scare before SARS, the 1976 ‘swine flu’ affair (Neustadt, 1983) – generated 
significant amplification effects in the SSAC. In the committee process members were guided by 
two important and related decision values. Firstly, they were attentive to all cases of completely 
contingent, unpredicted spread, which might indicate a threat to the community. They were 
particularly alarmed by the reports that arrive at the end of March of the outbreak of SARS 
amongst the residents of a large apartment building (the Amoy Gardens) in Hong Kong, 
apparently spread through the air conditioning system. Secondly, they therefore made decision 
based on worst case scenarios, preferring the costs of over to under reacting (interview data). 
These values were also held by the community (focus group data).  
 
The result was recommendations for disruptive containment measures that, since actions are 
powerful communications in themselves, greatly amplified risk signals. These ‘social distance’ 
measures targeted particular public mobilities within the networked social space in the city (see 
Sheller, 2004). The extensive quarantines – 30 000 people were examined for quarantine in 
Toronto alone (Hawryluck et al, 2004) – the closure of one hospital and cancellations of visitor 
access and non essential service, school closures and event cancellations (Naylor, 2004; 
Campbell, 2004, 2005) were very strong signals about the magnitude of the risk. The consequent 
impacts, such as those unable to visit mortally ill loved ones or those who suffered or died as a 
result of inability to access medical services during SARS (Svoboda et al 2004), generated their 
own amplification effects through local social networks. 
 
The composition of the responding professional network, especially the lack of connectivity with 
a particular node (see Urry 2004), led to a block in information flow and a consequent lack of 
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ability to generate critique of committee decisions, a structural bias that has also existed in 
other health scares (Neustadt, 1983). A prominent former Chief Medical Officer of Health, now 
the CEO of a major SARS affected hospital during the outbreak, very early queried the extent of 
the outbreaks within health care settings on the basis of incidence data that showed the rate of 
infection had peaked and as declining before the end of March – about the time the Amoy 
Gardens outbreak was reported – and hence queried the extent of the containment measures. 
However, he was denied access to the SSAC as a result of previous poor relations with some of 
its members. Severing this node from the network led to risk signal amplification as he then 
made his objections publicly (Schabas, 2003). 
 
Having demonstrated how network composition and structural connectivity can generate 
amplification effects, I should now draw attention to its potential for attenuation. Professional 
networks strongly attenuated SARS risk signals in two ways. Firstly, clinical learning through local 
professional networks meant that responders could soon make decisions based on technical 
information rather than on values. This new security augmented outrage at the travel advisory 
issued by the WHO at the time of the second outbreak (interview data). Secondly, the 
international network of scientists and health professionals that raced to gain knowledge about 
SARS functioned as a brilliant example of the successful ‘network enterprise’ (Castells, 2000), 
circulating both the virus (for experimental work) and scientific information at record speed 
around the globe, coordinated by the WHO. The rapid genetic sequencing of the virus and the 
accumulation of clinical information generated containment and treatment actions that brought 
the epidemic under control much faster.  
 
Communication networks. Two communications networks were explicitly subject to extensive 
criticism for amplifying risk during and after the outbreaks (Naylor, 2004; Campbell, 2004, 2005). 
The first were intra- and inter-governmental. The failures in communication between local, 
provincial and national government levels were legion: epidemiological tracking done 
painstakingly by post-it note in the ‘war room’; cross-country daily briefing conference calls for 
communications officers involving literally thousands of people; the absence of contact details 
for the province’s family physicians (a common feature of health scares (Skouby, 1998)). Issues 
about data ownership and access between the three levels of government generated risk issue 
signal amplification at the WHO in relation to Canadian government capacity that led to the 
travel advisory (Naylor, 2004). Again, lack of connectivity and limits on the (literal) space of 
flows generated by poor communications resources (Castells, 2000) amplified risk signals during 
SARS.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the mass media, especially newspaper and television coverage, was also 
commonly identified as a risk signal amplifier during the outbreaks. For example, images of 
people wearing masks were criticized as atypical and were perceived as crucial risk amplification 
symbols (focus group data). However, criticism was not uniform. Local media, at least in 
Toronto, was in general praised for reporting timely and accurate information and, despite 
constraints in their professional position, for intelligent engagement in the story as it unfolded 
(interview data, see also Drache and Feldman, 2003). It was international media networks that 
were blamed, along with the travel advisory, as major contributors to the severe economic 
impact of SARS on Toronto because they simplified, decontextualised and hence sensationalized 
the story. International media generated great outrage – a much-examined feature of health 
scares (Sandman 2005) – and which persisted despite the facts that (a) most Torontonians 
agreed that they would not travel to south east asia, outbreak areas at the time and (b) 
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Torontonians noticed risk signal amplification occurred as a function of distance in interpersonal 
social networks (this is a common network effect of crises (Slovic, 2000) (focus group data). 
 
The most serious media impact lay in the use of images of asian people in relation to SARS, 
which tended to ‘mark’ them as carriers of disease in ways the significantly contributed to their 
general stigmatization, a well-understood effect of amplification processes in health scares 
(Leung, 2004, Pidgeon et al 2004: 13-46, 326-336).  
 
Employee networks. As has been discussed elsewhere in this volume, the physical extent of the 
outbreak in Toronto directly resulted from neo-liberal policies that saw the underfunding of 
health care systems and the casualisation of the health care workforce, particularly in nursing. 
Semi-formal social networks among health care workers therefore acted as SARS risk signal 
amplifiers in two ways. Firstly, because these responders were working for very long hours in 
stressful conditions but were reliant on each other for support, informal communication 
through the networks acted to validate experience but also to deepen the sense of crisis (Schull 
and Redermeier, 2003). Secondly, outrage about exposure to the risk and inadequate 
safeguarding, backed by long standing outrage over the gendered inequities of their position 
within the health care system, immensely amplified risk signals among nurses (Naylor, 2004). 
Nurses also felt financially punished by the outbreak because they were limited to working in 
one hospital instead of the three or four that many commonly used to generate a fulltime 
income. Worse, many felt stigmatized in the general community, in part as a result of selective 
media reporting (especially the notorious ‘nurse on the GO train’ incident (Campbell, 2004)). 
Because some of them threatened to walk off the job, this amplification had the potential to 
greatly magnify the extent and impact of the epidemic itself.  
 
VI. Conclusion and Implications. 
 
We can understand SARS as a health scare by a analysis of the kind of network dynamics 
proposed by Castells (2000) as central to modern social organization in a globalizing, 
interconnected and information technology dependent world. This analysis fits the conceptual 
structure provided by the social amplification of risk framework (Pidgeon et al 2003). 
 
Risk signal amplification during SARS was productive of the kind of severe social and economic 
impacts that are characteristic of health scare situations. SARS carried strong risk signals – it was 
a novel disease arising in part from the environmental pressures of the late capitalist, globalizing 
era, and appeared to threaten the security of developed nations. As in other health scares, 
information and symbols flowing through local and international professional networks raised 
great fears about its possible mortality toll, but in fact the number of deaths was miniscule 
compared with many forms of preventable death in the nations it affected. The fearful and 
precautionary response from experts and governments at various levels was, as in many other 
health scares, greatly exacerbated by lack of connectivity, node exclusion and other network 
disruptions that impaired the enterprise and blocked feed-back processes. The huge negative 
impacts suffered as a result of the outbreaks of SARS were, as in other health scares, both 
economic and social. Amongst the most damaging were the long-term, physically debilitating 
stress suffered by those affected, including responders, and the stigmatization of particular 
social groups, Asians and health care workers.  
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It should not be forgotten that risk signal amplification also generated positive actions, some of 
which in turn generated attenuation effects. Among these can be included the swift response of 
the highly networked international scientific community, coordinated through the WHO, which 
greatly strengthened the organisation’s role as the central node for disease control networks in 
a globalised world (Fidler 2004). The advent of SARS has also strengthened pandemic 
preparedness planning in many nations, in which the explicit creation of response networks 
through different sectors of government has been made central.  
 
Health scares are largely testimonies to western anxieties and have been productive of global 
and local inequalities and ‘othered’ identities, reinscribing the boundaries between the ‘first’ 
and the ‘third’ world despite the fact that increasing connectivity has generated an increased 
likelihood of a primary health scare category, a new infectious disease (King 2002). But the 
reality of the potential threats remain, and so does the uncertainty. Whether or not to react to a 
particular constellation of raindrops as if it were the hundred year flood is a question that 
worries most of those to whom the responsibility of intervention falls. In these scenarios the 
network enterprise is a crucial provider of speedy and effective answers, leaving us the luxury of 
debating the values that we wish to guide our choices in health scare situations in the future. 
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